This paper assesses the optimal pricing policy of a risk-averse …rm electing to expand production in foreign markets. We analyze aggregate and industry-speci…c foreign direct investments data of large Spanish …rms in South America over the past two decades, devoting special attention to …rms operating in telecommunications. To solve the location problem of the …rm, we exploit portfolio choice techniques that rely on the similarity between changes in a …rm's marginal costs in foreign (risky) markets and changes in the share of …nancial wealth allocated to risky assets in portfolio theory. The constant domestic marginal cost plays the role of the riskless asset. We …nd that producing in di¤erent locations is optimal if the …rm may charge di¤erent prices. Further, under certain conditions on the …rm's average revenues, a pseudo-dumping policy is desirable. In this instance, the loss incurred in foreign markets is compensated for by the pro…ts in the domestic one. JEL Classi…cation: D21, D43, D81, F23, G11.
Introduction
The economic literature often deals with a …rm's pricing problem from a strictly deterministic viewpoint. However, when evaluating the pro…t-maximizing strategies in markets other than the domestic one, a fully deterministic setting does not seem appropriate. The lack of full information about the structure and functionning of a destination market strongly a¤ects the returns of an investment choice (Markusen, 2002) . The incomplete information is an important source of uncertainty that makes di¢ cult to describe this problem in a fully deterministic setting. The seminal papers on …rm decision-making by Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) are the …rst ones studying the …rm's behavior in an uncertain setting. At the competitive equilibrium under uncertainty, Sadmo (1971) proves that the level of the …rm output depends on the changes in …rm …x production costs. Leland (1972) expands part of the analysis presented by Sadmo and he establishes that risk averse …rms set lower quantity and prices when the demand risk decreases and the marginal costs are not decreasing.
Motivated by their …ndings, we study the optimal pro…t-maximization strategy that aims at producing in foreign markets while maintaining ongoing production in the domestic market. For the very …rst time in literature, in our setting, uncertainty is embedded in the production costs that a …rm faces in foreign markets, which we model as time-varying stochastic processes. Thus, we assume that uncertainty a¤ects the technology adopted by the …rm in the destination markets, rather than the demand for goods and services. Furthermore, as time passes, …rms become experienced through operating in uncertain production environments and learn to manage risk more e¤ectively. Our dynamic optimization framework poses that …rms maximize the expected intertemporal utility of their pro…ts subject to stochastic production costs in foreign markets and locally deterministic costs in the domestic market. Following Leland's (1972) intuition, we model production costs through a Wiener process (as stock prices are modeled in standard portfolio theory).
Our choice to embed uncertainty in the supply side rather than in the demand one is driven by a few empirical regularities. First, foreign direct investment (FDI) are much more resilient to political instability in host countries and democracy accountability (Brusse and Hefeker, 2007). Moreover, Joeng (2002) assesses that in low income countries high political uncertainty negatively impacts the returns of the irreversible investments. Dasu and Li (1997) and Rugman and Verbeke (2004) link location decisions under uncertainty to economic and political episodes in foreign markets. A parallel line of research, including, among others, Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998), focuses on FDI aimed at gaining …scal advantages and/or exploiting various local resources. However, if these two regularities were always ful…lled, a pro…t-maximizing …rm would never invest in high risky markets.
Instead, we can prove that FDI inward stock in those markets is progressively increasing. To this end, we compile foreign direct investment data (stocks and ‡ows) of large Spanish …rms in South America. Aggregate data range from the early 1990s to the late 2000s while industry-level data cover the past decade. Given …rms'assets information, we also calculate assets management and pro…tability indexes to gain further insights on key elements driving …rms'choices (Tables I-III and   Figure I and II) . We easily detect an increasing interest in investing in these destination countries in a decade in which these countries experienced important (and often unexpected) political turmoils.
In spite of this unstable environment, …rm pro…ts and FDI returns multiplicated.
A …rst theory looking at disentangling the dynamics of this puzzling results has been proposed by Joneba (2002) . He established that tax-waiver programmes and the lack of political risk do not often …nd support as determinants for investments in some countries. His argument identi…es the multy-country investment as the optimal strategy to cope with the various degree of host market risk. Di¤erences in production costs and government strategies makes of the multi-country investment a sustainable and feasible strategy.
Also Lucas (1990) partially anticipated this outcome. He concluded that the lack of investments in some low-cost countries and the persistent production in high-cost and industrialized countries depends on the large political risk in the former countries and the political stability in the latter ones. But, Janeba (2002) goes further: he identi…es the conditions (as di¤erences in costs and credibility) that discriminates …rms'maximizing behaviour . The author concludes that a dominant strategy of a …rm is either to invest in one-high-cost-but-political-stable country or diversify the investments in a few low-cost-but-political-unstable countries keeping excess capacity everywhere otherwise, eventually, invest a little just in the less costly and political unstable country if this country grants subsidies to foreign investors. In a perfect competitive market, allowing …rms for trading across markets and with a government potentially committing for some subsidies, a …rm taking the risk to invest in political unstable countries seems balancing the risk of the investment by splitting it into several locations. The excess capacity (associated with the constant returns to scale) is the form of insurance above all when …xed costs are introduced.
Nevertheless, our empirical evidence forces us to leave the hypothesis of competitive markets.
Since we observe that the strategic interaction amongst …rms (above all operating in telecommunications) closely resembles a market structure with a dominant …rm and a competitive fringe, we elect to center our analysis on this framework (and sector). Therefore, we develop a new framework in which foreign investing …rms are the dominant ones in host destinations. They choose to serve the local market; they have to compete with the local competitors as well as cope with the host market risk. In order to tackle this problem we use the mathematical technique applied in …nance to solve the …rm-pro…t-maximizing problem in a dynamic and stochastic framework. In this framework, it is assumed that a …rm maximizes the expected intertemporal utility when incurring stochastic production costs in host destinations.
Our contribution is twofold: on one hand, we introduce time-varying uncertainty in the …rms' cost function and we allow it to diminish over time through a learning process. On the other hand, we identity key elements that make pricing policies optimal. We …nd that, under certain conditions on the …rm's average revenues, a price discriminating policy is the optimal one. In this instance, the loss incurred in foreign markets is compensated for by the pro…ts in the domestic one. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present empirical evidence that motivates our theoretical framework, which we develop and solve in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive conditions under which the optimal policy is compatible with dumping. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical evidence
Large, prosperous companies often …nd it optimal to expand production in markets other than the domestic one. In this scenario, (host) country risk is the main driving factor for location choices. In fact, concerns toward country-speci…c risks such as currency controls, regulatory changes and political turmoil, may adversely a¤ect operating pro…ts and the value of assets in place. Table I ) we observe that only investments in natural resources, telecommunications and …nance are equally present across countries. Among them, investments in natural resources are generally not undertaken to serve the local market. On the contrary, services need be produced and sold in loco and cannot be either outsourced or imported.
These features, and a few others described below, make the service sector ideal for our analysis. These quotas are far from negligible especially in light of the risks, both political and economical, that have been threatening South America during the past decade (Markusen, 2002) . Although demand shocks, high in ‡ation rates and currency depreciations can severely lower investors'profitability, these determinants have only marginally a¤ected the operations, …nancing and investing of Spanish corporations. As reported in Table 2 , Spanish data on total assets and total assets turnover ratios in South America (cumulatively) improved steadily across all industries and more noticeably in wholesome trade, depository institutions and telecommunications.
Although these numbers may re ‡ect a positive change in demand for newly available goods and services, we argue that they are primarily the outcome of a particular market structure. Our rationale is as follows. The strategic interaction amongst …rms, especially depository institutions and …rms operating in telecommunications, closely resembles a model with a dominant …rm and a competitive fringe. 3 Here, the market is dominated by a large …rm that competes with numerous smaller …rms. The market share of the dominant …rm is usually orders of magnitude larger than that of a fringe …rm: superior quality products and high e¢ ciency in production are two of the many reasons that would grant a …rm substantial market power. Market power, in turn, enables the dominant …rm to pro…tably price above marginal costs, without setting a monopolistic price at which its (price-taking) competitors do not produce. We illustrate this phenomenon in Table   III . Telefonica-Movistar, a Spain-based telecommunications company, o¤ers various services in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. 4 We compare its average rates per minute with those of two local competitors in 2008 and 2011. The data show that Telefonica-Movistar dominates its smaller competitors and provides them a pricing umbrella: 5 it is the gorilla of the telecommunications market.
Relying on this evidence, we now develop a simple, yet comprehensive, theoretical framework to explain a dominant …rm's pricing strategies under uncertainty.
Model

Output
This Section describes the …rm's pro…t function, with special attention to output and production costs both domestically and internationally.
We choose a market structure in which a large …rm competes with numerous smaller …rms (fringe). In this market, the pricing policy chosen by the dominant …rm is bounded. On the one hand, the threat of entry by additional …rms causes the dominant …rm to set a price lower than the price set by a monopolist. On the other hand, such price ought to exceed the price charged by fringe …rms to guarantee their operations. Then, the e¢ cient dominant …rm will realize a surplus by satisfying the (time-varying) fraction of market demand that the fringe cannot meet and the fringe …rms will make zero pro…ts. We indicate by q 
Production costs
Since quantities are known at all times, it is the …rm's technology in foreign markets that renders pro…ts uncertain. We posit an economy comprised of n + 1 countries, the country where the dominant …rm's headquarters are sited and n foreign countries. Following Leland's (1972) intuition, we exploit the similarity between an investor's optimal portfolio allocation and a dominant …rm's pricing strategy and we model foreign marginal costs through an Itô process (as stock prices are modeled in standard portfolio theory). Speci…cally, foreign marginal costs, c f = c 
where I c f is the n-by-n diagonal matrix of foreign marginal costs, c f ;t is a vector of instantaneous expected growth rates and c f ;t is a n-by-n diagonal matrix of instantaneous volatility coe¢ cients.
z t is a Brownian Motion process de…ned in R n and T is the …rm's …nite …xed operating horizon.
The locally-deterministic domestic marginal cost plays the role of the riskless asset with dy-
in which r is an instantaneous growth rate, and is constant over time. We assume that there is a unique risk-neutral probability measure associated with the model and that the sales of services is permitted without restrictions (taxes, tari¤s, etc.,).
Preferences
Let t 0 denote the …rm's pro…ts at time t. Preferences are posited to be an instantaneous time-separable power utility function over pro…ts
in which 1 is the constant coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion -the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is 1 . Finally, further in the spirit of portfolio analysis, we require no exogenous infusion or withdrawal of money (self-…nancing pro…ts)
where p Letting f > 0 be a …xed cost incurred at the onset of production, Eq. (5) characterizes the …rm's static budget constraint
where t e f rt c f ( c f r1 n ), 6 and E is the time-zero expectation operator that encompasses the probability distribution of all states of the world over the …rm's operating horizon.
In the following Subsection we derive the optimal pricing policies. The solution methodology is based on Cox and Huang (1989) and Nualart (2006).
Optimal pricing policies
Solving the unconstrained analogue to Eq. (5) yields the optimal contingent pro…t t = ( )
where > 0 is the constant subjective discount factor and , de…ned below, is the constant multiplier attached to the static budget constraint
The resulting optimal prices are set equal to
in foreign markets, and
in the domestic market.
The solution is the algebraic sum of two components, marginal costs and a mark-up over marginal costs. In foreign markets, the latter resembles the optimal mean-variance portfolio policy of Markowitz (1952) : optimal prices are inversely proportional to the level of risk aversion, , and the level of risk (as measured by the volatility, c f ;t ) and directly proportional to the premium ( c f ;t r1 n ). Moreover, if foreign marginal costs grow (in absolute value) at a faster rate than the domestic one does, then the …rm's market power results in a positive mark-up. In the domestic market, low levels of risk aversion and risk, combined with a modest …xed cost, may translate into optimal prices below marginal costs. Consequently, for some quadruplet f( c f ;t r1 n ) ; c f ;t ; ; f g, the dominant …rm incurs a loss in foreign markets and pro…ts in the domestic one, or vice versa.
(Pseudo)Dumping
In this Section we analyze predatory dumping, an important consequence of price discrimination for international trade. While price discrimination generally refers to the practice of charging different prices to di¤erent buyers (Eqs. (8) and (9) in Subsection 3.4), dumping is associated with selling exported goods and services at lower prices than the same goods and services sold domestically. 7 Thus, this form of predatory pricing is more widely adopted in segmented markets where domestic buyers cannot access goods and services intended for exports. Although often considered a legitimate business maneuver by economists, predatory dumping is regarded as unfair in trade policy and it has been repeatedly regulated. In the United States, as well as in numerous other countries, …rms that can prove damages sustained due to dumping may appeal for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty. While a …rm could exercise dumping only temporarily with the goal of becoming the sole producer in a market, and subsequently raising prices to the monopoly level, in many circumstances dumping is permanent and aimed at boosting total pro…ts. 8 Straightforward algebraic manipulations of Eqs. (8) and (9) deliver the condition under which the dominant …rm optimally discriminates amongst markets and sets p f t lower than p
Then, regulators and advocates of free markets and laborers'rights, who lobby for the implementation of anti-protectionism laws, must guarantee that prices charged in foreign markets, the left-hand side of Eq. (10), exceed average revenues, the right-hand side. The data is collected in Table IV . Some clari…cations are in order to make this exercise meaningful. In both cases, competitors of the group brought a lawsuit against it to recover the damages caused by its unfair practice. These actions have been amply covered by the international media 9 and are currently pending.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the pricing strategies of multinational enterprises. We extend the existing literature by considering the imperfect market structure with a large, dominant …rm and smaller, price-taking fringe …rms. Our novelty is to introduce time-varying uncertainty in the …rms' cost function. Under the assumption that risk a¤ects the …rm's technology, we …nd that price discrimination across markets is the optimal pricing policy. In particular, in foreign markets the optimal pricing policy resembles the mean-variance portfolio policy of Markowitz (1952) and optimal prices are inversely proportional to the level of risk. In the domestic market, low levels of risk and risk aversion jointly with modest …xed costs of investments in foreign markets may …x optimal prices below domestic marginal costs. Further, we explore some conclusions about the conditions yielding predatory pricing. In our framework, dumping is optimal for all sets of parameters such that the optimal price charged in foreign markets does not exceed the form's average revenues.
A few statistics exploiting historical data on the operations of the Spanish group TelefonicaMovistar support our …ndings.
This framework enables a wide range of future research. This framework has been developed by admitting a …rm's cost function diminishing over time throught a learning process. It can be adapted, for example, to analyze a …rm's optimal pricing policies within an economy in which the …rm has a (real) option to invest in a particular foreign market. Jump processes (à la Poisson) could also be included to better account for disaster events. Notes: Total assets in euro millions; TATO stands for total assets turnover. Notes: Pre-paid one-minute call to any local destination without time constraints.
